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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH
FRED G. JENSEN and
MIRIAM D. JENSEN,
Plaintiff and Appellants

vs.
RAY L. NIELSEN and
MABEL W. NIELSEN,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case
No.
11167

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
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NATURE OF THE CASE
Respondents agree with the Appellants' brief as to
the nature of the case.
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT
Respondents agree with the Appellants' brief as
to the disposition in the lower court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek to have the Order of the lower
court affirmed on the grounds set forth in the Order
as well as the additional grounds stated herein.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Appellants brought an action in February,
1965 in the Sixth Judicial District Court for Garfield
County, Utah, seeking restitution based on Respondents alleged unjust enrichment.
Under contract the Respondents sold to the Appellants their motel property located in Panguitch,
Utah, known as Nelson's motor Court (R-1-6). The
contract was signed about July 1, 1958, the
Appellants paying $10,150.00 down, and taking possession. From the beginning the appellants were delinquent in their payments on the contract. They did,
however, make payments on the contract until December 1, 1961, but during that time had failed
to pay all the property taxes as they became due ( R-3940). The appellants made substantial changes in the
motel property, which rather than improved the property reduced its value (R-9).
The appellants were in possession of the property
for a period of six to seven months after default in payments, before the respondents, under the provisions of
the contract rescinded the same and removed the con'
tract documents
from escrow.
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The appel~ants then vacated the premises and the
Respondents did not hear from them again until 196o
when they were sued for $15,000.00. A period of more
t~an two and one-half years (R-1-6). Respondents'
filed an Answer and Counter Claim, and various proceedings were had. Finally in May, 1967, Appellan~
gave Notice of taking the deposition of Mr. T. H. Heal
on Written Interrogatories and at this point the reconl
becomes confused ( R-28-29).
Mr. Durham Morris, representing the Respondents, propounded Cross Interrogatories to Mr. T. H.
Heal, which was filed on April 10, 1967, nearly a month
prior to the time Appellants claim Notice of Interroga·
tories was given, and more than four months prior t-0
the time the record shows that Appellants' Notice to the
Respondents was filed (R-25-27). The Cross Interroga·
tories were never propounded to Mr. Heal, as it clearly
shown by the said deposition ( R-32-35).
The Cross Interrogatories also state that they are
to be propounded to Mr. Heal at his deposition to be
taken before Shirley Huffaker in Mesa, Arizona, and
pursuant to Notice of Taking Written Interrogatories
heretofore filed and served upon attorney for defend·
ants (R-25). The interesting fact is that nowhere in the
record of the Court does any Notice appear, except the
one filed August 29, 1967 at the time Summary Judg·
ment was taken.
On August 14, 1967 Appellants served Notice of
Motion for Summary Judgment upon the defenda~t.
There is no doubt that the Respondents received notice
of the hearing, although there is considerable question
as to whether the Respondents were aware of just what
the nature of the hearing would be ( R-59-63). It should
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be further noted that although the filing date of the
Motion for Summary Judgment is August 15, 1967,
the number 15 is superimposed in ink over what appears to be a 29 made by the Clerk's official stamp
(R-38).

The defendants failed to appear and the plaintiff's
took Summary Judgment on August 29, 1967.
At the same time the Summary Judgment was taken
th plaintiffs also apparently filed the following papers:
i\otice of Taking Deposition (R-38), Direct Interrogatories (R-30), Answers to Written Interrogatories by
Deposition ( R-32), Motion for Summary Judgment
(R-38), and Reply to Defendant's Request for Admission of Fact ( R-39).
The plaintiffs subsequently garnished the defendants' bank account, and the defendants' thereafter
moved to Vacate the Judgment under Rule 60( b)
(1 J Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (R-47-48). The
Coul't vacated the Summary Judgment on the grounds
that there was mistake, surprise and excusable neglect,
and that the court should have taken evidence to justify
the Judgment (R-89-90).
For the reasons set forth hereafter the Respondents seek to have the court's decision affirmed.
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
PLAINTIFFS HAD NOT FAILED TO GIVE
PROPER NOTICE TO DEFENDANTS IN REGARDS TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF ATTORNEYS.
Counsel for Appellants has argued that Section
78-51-36, Utah Code Anno., 1953 does not apply in the
instant case because this section is applicable only
where the withdrawing attorney ceases the practice of
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law. Counsel cites Vancott vs. Wall 53 Utah 282, 1n
P. ~3 and 42 A.L.R. 134 7 as authority for this con.
tent10n.
·
Without disputing the holding of the above auth.
o:it! it ~hould be noted that the instant case is clearly
d1stmgmshable from either the VanCott case or any of
the cases cited in 42 ALR 1347.
All of the cases relied on by Appellants deal with
the requirements of Notice where the attorney had
withdrawn immediately before the trial or hearing upon
which judgment was granted. In the present case, the
last attorney to represent the Respondents prior to
Summary Judgment was M. Durham Morris, Cedar
City, Utah. Mr. Morris withdrew as attorney for De·
fendants in May of 1967. This was more than three
months prior to the Notice of Motion for Summary
Judgment ( R-37), and the Appellants had sufficient
time in that period to give the required notice.
A reading of the cases involving this point shows
that the clear intent of the decisions is to prevent un·
necessary delay and injustice. That problem is not even
remotely present here. On the contrary the injustice
and any delay is now due to the appellants' failure to
give proper Notice.
Appellants do cite one case in which the with·
drawal of counsel was a short time prior to the Judg·
ment taken, Se<!urity Adjustment Bureau, Inc. vs. West
20 Utah 2d 292, 437 P2d 214. In that case, however,
the courts only comment on this point was that the
VanCott Case was controlling. The court set aside the
Judgment on other grounds, which made the questi~n
of notice to appoint new counsel moot. Justice ~enro1d
who wrote the opinion suggested that the rule m Van
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Cott may be subject to some legitimate criticism and
analysis. Respondents would certainly agree.
The rule in the V anCott case seems to render Section 78-51-36 useless. One wonders why it is important
to require Notice if an attorney dies, is removed, suspended or retires from practice, but not if he merely
withdraws. The client is just as much without an attorney. Much has been said in other cases about an attorney not being able to withdraw without the consent
of the court, but the same reasoning should be true in
case the attorney retires from practice. There seems to
be no clear cut reason for requiring notice of withdrawal and demand for appointing new counsel in some
situations and not others. Section 78-51-35 Utah Code
Anno. 1953 requires an attorney to recognize the attorney for the adverse party until he is notified of a
change, and apparently this applies in all situations.
Sali11a Canyon Coal Co. v. Klemin, 76 Utah 372, 290
P. 161 at pages 377-78. Why then should not Section
78-51-36 apply in all cases?
In the present case the appellants were fully
aware the respondents were not represented by counsel, yet in a three-month period they never gave the
defendants any notice or demand to appoint a new attorney. It is suggested that such an effort on the part of
the appellants might have avoided the present appeal.

The proper rule for the court to follow under Section 78-51-36 would seem to be that where no injustice
will result because of undue delay, notice to appoint
counsel should be required in all situations.
POINT II
THE RECORD AS SET FORTH IN PLAINTIFFS' AND DEFENDANTS' DESIGNATION OF
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RECORD ON APPEAL IS EVIDENCE TO sup.
PORT THE FINDINGS OF THE COURT THAT
THERE WAS MISTAKE, SURPRISE AND EXCUSABLE NEGLECT ON THE PART OF THE DE.
FENDANTS IN NOT APPEARING FOR THE
HEARING ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON AUGUST 29, 1967, WHEN
CONSIDERED WITH THE DEFENDANTS' AFFIDAVIT AND THAT OF NORMAN H. JACKSON
'
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS.
In Point I of their Brief, Counsel for Appellants
state that although the Order Setting Aside and Vacating Summary Judgment recites a finding of mistake~
surprise, and excusable neglect the court in fact did not
make any such finding at the hearing. The record of
that hearing clearly indicates that there was mistake,
surprise and excusable neglect.
The Respondent Mabel W. Nielsen testified as
follows:
"Q. (Mr. Tibbs) Mrs. Nielsen, did you
understand that there would be a hearingtake
place on August 29, which would be the trial
of this cause in which this court would be
asked for a Judgment against you?"
"A. I didn't understand there was anything pertaining to a Judgment against us. I
was notified that there would be a trial or a
hearing at that time, yes."
"Q. Did you understand that it would be
the trial and it would be the time that the
rights of the parties both Plaintiff and D~
fendant would be settled and a formal and final judgment entered in this cause?"
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"A. I certainly did not." (R-60)
"Q. (Mr. Jackson) Notice of Motion for
Summary Judgment?"
"A. No, I don't know anything about a
Summary Judgment. Whatever the case was
on the 29th, I know I received a copy.
"Q. You know you received a Notice of
some hearing on the 29th?"
"A. And I had no understanding of any
Summary Judgment or anything of that sort."
(R-64).
Mrs. Nielsen's testimony clearly indicates that although she understood there would be a hearing on
August 29, 1968, she was not aware of the nature of
the proceedings and definately did not understand
there would be a judgment taken against her.
As to whether Mr. Nielsen was aware of the nature of the hearing Mrs. Nielsen further testified:
"Q. (Mr. Tibbs) Mrs. Nielsen, what I am
after, to your knowledge has your husband's
condition, mental condition at times caused
him to misunderstand what people have told
him?"
"A. Yes." (R-61).
"THE COURT: Just tell us what the
condition was."
"A. My husband has had a severe heart
condition for sometime. The primary reason
we sold our court in the first place is because
things do upset him unduly because of that
condition." ...
"Q. (Mr. Tibbs) When he is in this condition, will you describe his actions?"
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"A. Well, other than what I have said I
don't know how I would describe his actions.
He is upset. It is difficult for him to work the
thing through as other people would see it that
way." (R-62).
"Q. (Mr. Tibbs) Mrs. Nielsen did you
receive any notice advising you to be in Court
on August 29, 1967?"
"A. Yes, I did."
"Q. Was your husband able to physically
appear to Court on that date?"
"A. No, I don't think he was." (R-63).
Mrs. Nielsen's testimony clearly indicates further
that. Mr. Nielsen because of his health did not understand the nature of the hearing on August 29, 1968.
This is certainly evidence from which the court
in its discretion could find mistake. One cannot help
but think that this problem would never have arisen
had the appellants given notice to appoint Counsel.
The facts above stated would clearly place the
case within the rule laid down by this court in Mayhew
v. Standard Gilsonite Co., 14 U 2d 52, 376 P 2d 951
where the Court said:
"It is undoubtedly correct that the trial
court is endowed with considerable latitude of
discretion in granting or denying such motions. However, it is true that the court cannot
act arbitrarily in that regard, but should be
generally indulgent toward permitting full
inquiry and knowledge of dispute so they can
be settled advisedly and in conformity with
law and justice. To clamp a judgment rigidly
and irrevocably on a party without a hearing
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is obviously a harsh and oppressive thing. It
it fundamental in our system of justice that
each party to a controversy should be afforded an opportunity to present his side of the
case. For that reason it is quite uniformly regarded as an abuse of discretion to refuse to
vacate a default judgment where there is reasonable justification or excuse for the defendant's failure to appear and timely application is made to set it aside."
A review of the affidavits of the parties further
shows the court was justified in setting the Judgment
aside. The defendant Ray L. Nielsen states in his Affidavit (R-49, 50) that he had been ill and under a doctor's care for a nervous condition, that during his conversation with Norman H. Jackson, attorney for plaintiffs he became confused, and uncertain as to the meaning of the hearing on August 29, 1967, and that he
further informed Mr. Jackson he had made prior plans
to go to Nevada on the day of the hearing and could
not be in attendance.
The affidavit of Norman H. Jackson confirms
that of the defendant as to the trip to Nevada (R-52)
and further shows that Mr. Nielsen could clearly have
been confused.
Mr. Jackson knew that Mr. Nielsen planned to go
to Nevada on the day of the hearing and knowing this
he pressed for Summary Judgment.

Having informed Mr. Jackson he was going to
Nevada on August 29, it was certainly not unreasonable to believe that Mr. Jackson would forego taking a
Judgment at that time if the defendant was not present. This would clearly have to be considered excusable
neglect.
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Finally the record itself indicates the court was
not acting unduly in setting aside the Judgment.
No less than four different papers were filed in
this matter on August 29, 1967, or later which should
have properly been in the record prior to that date. It
appears that the Notice of taking of Depositions on
Written Interrogatories may have been filed October
24, 1967, nearly two months after the court granted
Summary Judgment ( R-80). A trained lawyer on
looking at the file for the first time would have been
confused from the record as it appeared on August
29, 1967. Certainly an ordinary layman would be sub·
ject to confusion also where he had no legal counsel to
advise him.
In short there was ample evidence for the Court
to determine that there was mistake and excusable
neglect on the part of the defendants and to vacate the
judgment previously granted.
The mere fact that the court did not say it speci·
fically found the mistake, surprise and excusable neg·
lect at the time of the hearing should not be controlling
here.
POINT III
THAT THE JUDGMENT GRANTED BY THE
COURT WAS NOT BASED ON ANY EVIDENCE
OR DAMAGE, THERE WERE NO FINDINGS OF
FACT AND THE COURT AT NO TIME WAS OF·
FERED OR RECEIVED ANY EVIDENCE UPON
WHICH TO BASE THE ALLEGED JUDGMENT
GRANTED.
The appellants contend that this point was. not
properly before the Court and could not be determrned
by the court at that time, and that under Rule 7 (b) (1)
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, only motions which are
incidental to the Orderly progress of the proceedings
may be made orally. The defendants claim this is pure
conjecture and that there is no basis in law for the
theory they assert. Rule l(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows:

" ( 1) They shall be liberally constructed
to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."
Rule 7(b) (1) would allow unwritten motions to
be made during hearing or trial. Counsel for defendants made a motion at the time of the hearing based
upon the original motion filed with the court and upon
other matters in the file which he would bring before
the court ( R-58-59). After having concluded his examination of Mrs. Nielsen, counsel for defendants then
brought the other matters in the file to the attention
of the Court ( R-7 4). This was an oral motion to the
court and did not need to be in writing. Aside from
this the written motion clearly stated that it was based
upon the Notice, the defendant's affidavit, the provisions of Rules 60 and 62 of the Utah Rules and the
evidence and testimony of the defendants to be offered
at the hearing (R-47). Respondents assert that under
Rule l(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Howard
v. Howard 11U2d149, 356 P2d 275 this was all that
was required.
Even if the Appellant's contentions as to the nature of Rule 7 ( b) ( 1) are correct the respondent asserts
that the motions and grounds stated by defendant's
counsel at the hearing were fully incidental to the orderly progress of the proceedings.
Any confusion which resulted at the time of the
-13Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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I
I

hearing was not due to any of the acts of defendant's \
I
counsel.

. T~e appell~nts also state that taking of evidence I
to Justify the Judgment was not necessary, since the
record shows the motions for Summary Judgment were I
made and granted on the basis of defendants' admissions a deposition and the complete files and records
in the action.
This is not so. First of all the defendants never
admitted anything except by failure to answer plaintiff's request for admissions. Under Rule 36(a) Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure matters not denied in the requested admissions within 10 days are deemed admitted. This, however, seems hardly the type of admission on which a Summary Judgment should be allowed,
especially when a look at the record shows that the Re·
quest for Admissions was filed at about the time the
defendants were between attorneys. (R 10 and 51).
As to the deposition, the record shows that this
was never filed until August 29, 1967, at the time of
the hearing ( R-32), and, there is some conjecture as
to whether it was even filed at that time. It is also
questionable as to whether it was ever published as
evidence on August 29, 1967 (R-78).
As to the record of the hearing on August 29, 1967
all we have is a statement of Proceeding (R-41-49), and
no actual "transcript," that being lost. The statement
was prepared by the counsel for Plaintiffs and is cer·
tainly self-serving. It is directly in conflict with the
transcript of the proceedings had on December 21,
1967 (R-78).
The plaintiffs have further contended that ~he
trial court erred in that it considered it was settmg
-14Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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aside a default judgment rather than a Summary
Judgment (R-81, 82, 83). While the plaintiffs are
technically correct, the defendants respectfully contend
that the court did not in actuality err and that the
hearing on August 29, 1968 was in a sense a default
matter.
The defendants were not represented by counsel,
and notice of the hearing had been given. There being
no one present at that time to contest the actions of
plaintiff, it really went by default. On this basis the
court's finding that it should have taken evidence is not
unreasonable, especially when considered in the light of
the state of the record at the time of the hearing as
refened to above.
POINT IV
THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN VACATING
AND SETTING ASIDE THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE RECORD SHOWS THAT
THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF FACT AND
THE PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO A
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
This last point is really the sum and substance of
this appeal. The entire matter really boils down to
whether the defendants have been given their day in
court.
In the conclusion of the Appellants' Brief opposing counsel contends that this matter is not proper
in this appeal because it is raised here for the first
time. This is just plainly not so.
First of all in their motion and notice to set aside
the Summary Judgment the defendants state that the
motion is based upon, among other things, the Affidavit of the Defendant Ray L. Nielsen (R-47). A re-15Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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view of the Affidavit shows that Mr. Nielsen claimed
he was not indebted to the Plaintiffs and that he had a
good and meritorious defense to the action ( R-50). This
is just the same as saying there are genuine issues of
fact. Under Howard vs. Howard previously cited, the
fact that the motion states it is based upon the Affi.
davit is sufficient to give the plaintiff notice of the
fact that this point would be relied upon in an effort
to have the Judgment vacated .
Further this matter was referred to and relied
upon in the hearing on December 21, 1967, as the fo].
lowing clearly indicates:
"Q. (Mr. Tibbs) Have you been advised
by counsel that you had a meritorious defense
to this action that was commenced by the
Jensens.
"A. (Mrs. Nielsen) Yes."
"Q. Have you ever had your day in court
to put on your defense?"
"A. Never" (R-70-71).
(The Court) [I] am aware of that mind
you as well as counsel for Plaintiffs, but despite that simply because we have exhausted
our patience is enough to deprive a litigant
of his day in court ... but this counsel now
contends that he has a meritorious defense to
this court, and the Judgment is a sizable sum
of money ... " (R-79).
The foregoing clearly shows that this point was
properly before the court at the December 21st hear·
ing and that it was considered and relied upon at that
time.
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As to the merits of this Point let us see if there are
any genuine issues of fact.
Plaintiff's motion for Summary Judgment states
it is based upon all of the files and records herein, including the pleadings and admissions of Defendants
and Answers to Written Interrogatories by Deposition
on file ( R-38). This motion was filed on August 15,
1967. At that time the deposition wasn't even in the file.
This aside, however, let us look at all the record.
Plaintiffs filed a Complaint charging the defendants were unjustly enriched when the plaintiffs defaulted on a real estate sales contract and the defendants repossessed pursuant to said contract (R-1-6).
The defendants answered by denying any unjust enrichment and further stated that the plaintiffs were
not timely in bringing any action for any relief they
might have been entitled to (R-7-9).
The plaintiffs filed a Request for Admissions
which Defendants never answered (R-10-12). All this
does, however, is put us back to where the parties were
at the time of the Complaint and Answer.
If the defendants failure to answer to admissions
is taken as an admission there is still no more before
the court than at the time the defendants filed their
answer. That means the defendants still deny any unjust enrichment and there is still a question of whether
the plaintiffs were timely in their action.

The Defendants thereafter filed a Request for Admissions ( R-22) which Plaintiffs answered but which
were never filed until August 29, 1967. A reading of
these items again shows that the matter is still at issue.
The Plaintiffs then gave notice of deposition by
written Interrogatories (R-28). Prior to this the de-17Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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fendants had filed cross Interrogatories (R-25-27). As.
has been previously stated, how these Interrogatories
got in the order they did and what happened to the
deposition which was to be taken before Shirley Huff.
aker is not shown from the record. It is clear, however,,
that they were on file and that the Plaintiff's counsel•
never asked the deponent T. H. Heal the questions in·
the Defendant's Interrogatories.
1

I

1

A reading of the deposition shows only that Mr.
Heal examined the property and the value he appraised
it at. There is nothing in the deposition to show the
value of the property at the time of the contract,
whether the appraised value was due to improvements
by the plaintiffs or even the exact date of the appraisal.
There is certainly nothing to show any unjust enrich·
ment. Had the Defendants' Interrogatories been put
to Mr. Heal at that time there might have been some
question as to the appraised value.

Thus at the time of the Summary Judgment we
have the following facts: ( 1) a contract to buy real ·
property, (2) default in payment by the Buyer, (3) I
repossession by the sellers, and that is all that is clear. !
Plaintiffs say there was unjust enrochment be· I
cause they made improvements. Defendants deny
there were any improvements and further say that
any rights the plaintiffs may have had were lost
because they were not timely in their action.

Is this the type of case that can be determined on I
motior1 for Summary Judgment? Obviously there were i
genuine issues of fact which could only be settled by a I
trial on the merits.
!
On a motion for Summary Judgment the Court is
obliged to view the evidence in the light most favorable
-1~
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to him against whom it is directed. Welchman vs. Wood
9 U 2d 25, 337 P 2d 410. Certainly viewed in the light
most favorable to the defendant in this case a Summary
Judgment was not proper, and the court in vacating the
Judgment was acting reasonable and within the law.
The Appellants apparently believe that from the
law and the facts they were entitled to a Summary
Judgment. A careful examination of the records shows
that the facts are still in dispute. Even if they were not,
however, the Respondents contend that the law would
not entitle the plaintiffs to a Summary Judgment. At
the time of the hearing for Summary Judgment counsel
for Appellants apparently cited four cases to the court
which they contended gave them the right to Summary
Judgment under the law. Respondents assert that these
cases do not support the appellants theory.
While a defaulting purchaser in Utah may recover
the excess of his payments over the vendors' damages,
3 U L. R. 30 at Page 40 the forfeiture provision in
contracts must allow such an unconscionable and exorbitant benefit to be retained by the Seller which bears
no relationship to the damages which the Seller has sustained or reasonably could have contemplated. Jacobson
vs. Swan 3 U 2d 59, 278 P. 2d 294.
This is something which cannot be determined by
Summary Judgment, especially in this case. There was
no where any proof or evidence as to the rental value
of the property. Nor was there any real showing of the
value of the property at the time of the repossession.
Also there was never any determination of the defendant's damages, nor any determination as to whether
the plaintiff was timely in bringing the action.
In short, there were just too many issues and loose
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~n?s t_o allo~ a Summary Judgment without a terrible
1IlJUStlce bemg done to the Defendants.
. Final!y, ~ Summary Judgment was not proper in
this case m hght of the record, because as this Court
has said before,
"Summary Judgment is a drastic remedy and courts should be reluctant to deprive
Utigants of an opportunity to fully present
their contentions upon a trial. It should be
granted only when under the facts viewed in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff he
could not recover as a matter of law." Welchman vs. Wood 9 U 2d 25, 337 P2d 410, also see
Housley vs. Anaconda Co. 19 U2d 124, 427
P2d 390.
That simply is not the case here.
CONCLUSION
The Respondents contend that because of the state
of the record and the facts as they actually existed that
the court acted correctly in vacating the Order for Sum·
mary Judgment.
The record was in a state of confusion, there was
clearly mistake and excusable neglect on the part of the
defendants in not appearing at the trial. There are
genuine issues off act which can only be determined by
a trial on the merits.
The Respondents ask only that they be given their
day in Court and that they have the opportunity to pre·
sent a defense to the charges of Appellants at that time.
If the contention of the appellant is just they have
nothing to fear from a trial on the merits. The check
they secured under Writ of Garnishment is still in the
-20-
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hands of the Court and would be available if they prevail at trial. On the other hand, if the appellant's contention is not just then the Respondents', who are elderly people, will lose their life savings and suffer an unjust economic set-back by the court reversing the decision of the trial court and reinstating the judgment.
For these reasons Respondents ask this honorable
court to affirm the decision of the trial court and to
remand this matter to the District Court for further
proceedings.

Respectfully submitted,
TIBBS & TERVORT
50 North Main
Manti, Utah
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